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Summary.  In economies with  indivisible  commodities,  consumers  tend  to prefer 
lotteries  in commodities. A  potential mechanism for satisying these preferences is 
unrestricted  purchasing  and  selling  of  lotteries  in  decentralized  markets,  as 
suggested in Prescott and Townsend [-Int. Econ. Rev. 25, 1-20]. However, this paper 
shows  in  several  examples  that  such  lottery  equilibria  do  not  always  exist  for 
economies  with  finitely  many  consumers.  Other  conditions  are  needed.  In  the 
examples, equilibrium and the associated welfare gains are realized if consumptions 
are bounded or if lotteries  are based upon a  common "sunspot device" as defined 
by Shell [-mimeo, 1977] and Cass and Shell [-J. PoE Econ. 91, 193-227]. The paper 
shows that any lottery equilibrium  is either a  Walrasian equilibrium  or a  sunspot 
equilibrium,  but  there  are  Walrasian  and  sunspot  equilibria  that  are  not lottery 
equilibria. 
1.  Introduction 
In economies with non-convexities, it is often the case that consumers can benefit 
from having their final consumption determined  by lottery. This idea, which does 
not  depend  on  consumers  having  preferences  favoring  risk,  is  demonstrated  in 
Prescott and Townsend  [18] for private information economies, and in Rogerson 
[19] for economies with  indivisible  labor.  More  recently,  Shell  and  Wright  [22] 
explore the role for lotteries and sunspots (of the type introduced by Shell [21] and 
Cass and Shell [3]) in markets with indivisibilities. 
In  this  paper,  the  trading  story  of Prescott  and  Townsend  is  applied  to  a 
finite-consumer market with indivisible commodities. Economies are described for 
which consumers benefit by having their final consumptions determined by lottery, 
but such gains cannot be decentralized in a market with unrestricted purchase and 
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sale of  lotteries. That is, allowing consumer demands to take the form of  individually 
chosen lotteries results in the non-existence of an equilibrium. It is shown, however, 
that equilibria for these economies exist, and welfare gains can be achieved in a 
decentralized manner, if specific bounds are placed on consumptions of the goods 
or  if all  consumers  agree  to  have  their  final  consumptions  determined  by  the 
outcome of a  single, commonly observed sunspot device. Equilibria of the latter 
type are sunspot equilibria (See Shell [21] and Cass and Shell [3]). 
The analysis furthers our understanding of the relationship between three well 
known  equilibrium  concepts;  Walrasian  equilibrium,  sunspot  equilibrium  and 
lottery  equilibrium.  The  need  for  understanding  along  these  lines  was  first 
stimulated by a claim in Prescott and Townsend [ 18, p. 18] that the equilibria found 
in their paper may be interpreted as equilibria for economies where consumers trade 
commodities that  are contingent on some extrinsic random  variable.  Shell and 
Wright [22] launched this comparison by considering the welfare properties and 
existence of Walrasian equilibria and sunspot equilibria in markets with indivisible 
commodities.  Also,  Shell and  Wright  [22,  Section 3]  show that  Rogerson  [19] 
employment lotteries can be decentralized as sunspot or non-sunspot equilibrium 
in the continuum-of-consumers case. This paper shows that any lottery equilibrium 
is  either a  Walrasian  equilibrium or a  sunspot equilibrium.  However, there are 
Walrasian and sunspot equilibria that are not lottery equilibria. 
This analysis is partially motivated by the recent popularity in labor economics 
and macro-economics of theoretical models involving indivisibilities and lotteries. 
Such models have been formulated to explain observed wage differentials across 
occupations of different risk (Marshall [12]), cyclical fluctuations (Hansen [9]), the 
presence and welfare implications of unemployment (Rogerson [19], Rogerson and 
Wright [20]), the relationship between inflation and unemployment (Greenwood 
and Huffman [8]), and in the study of island economies (Prescott and Rios-Rull 
[16]).  Cooley  and  Smith  [4]  explain  why  government  liabilities  are  issued  in 
indivisible form and Smith and Villamil [24] discuss why lotteries are used along 
with them. Furthermore, Ng [14] provides an argument why consumers facing a 
decision to purchase an indivisible commodity, education, might choose to purchase 
lottery tickets and Garratt and Marshall [7] use this notion to advance a theory of 
the public finance of college education. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 the base (Walrasian) economy 
is described. In Section 3 that economy is viewed as a lottery economy by means 
of a re-specification of the consumption and production sets. A lottery equilibrium 
is defined and examples are given demonstrating the possibility of non-existence 
and how this depends on bounds placed on consumptions of the goods. In Section 
4  consumers are  required to make  trades  contingent on  a  commonly observed 
sunspot variable. In Section 5 concluding remarks are made. 
2.  Trade without lotteries 
Identify individual consumers by i =  1, 2  ..... I. There are j =  1,2  ..... J consumption 
goods each  of which  is  indivisible (i.e.,  individual  consumption  goods  are  only 
available in integer amounts). Let ~e denote the integers and let bj~  + + denote Decentralizing lottery allocations  297 
the  bound  on  the  amount  of consumption  good j  that  may  be  consumed  by 
consumers in the economy. Thus, there is a finite number of permissible consumption 
bundles in the economy, each of which corresponds to a point in ~es+ (the Cartesian 
product ofY'+, J times) with the first coordinate specifying the units of consumption 
good 1 and so on). Consumption bundles in the economy are described as elements 
of the set C =  {cs~S+ :cj <  b~, j =  1  .... , J} where c  i denotes the (integer) amount of 
the  consumption  good  j  in  consumption  bundle  c.  Suppose  the  number  of 
consumption  bundles  in  C  is  equal  to  K.  Denote  the  consumption  bundles  by 
c 1  ..... c k  ..... c K, and consider each consumption bundle to be a different commodity. 
In particular, consumption bundle c k is commodity k, k =  1,..., K. This method of 
defining commodities comes from Prescott and Townsend [ 17] and [ 18]. Quantities 
of the K commodities are represented by points x = (x 1  ..... xK)e91K. Thus, 9~  K is the 
commodity space. 
Without lotteries, consumers choose one of the commodities for consumption. 
For example, x = (0  ..... 0, 1,0  ..... 0). The consumption set for each consumer i is 
1 
~  i  z  i  " 
k=l 
The  consumption  bundle  initially  held  by  the  consumer  is  the  endowment 
commodity of which he or she has 1 unit. Let k i denote the endowment commodity 
of consumer i. It is  assumed that ck'eC.  Let ~i~fl r  be the endowment vector of 
consumer  i.  That  is,  ~i=(O,...,O,l,O ..... 0),  where  ~'=1  and  ~=0  gkCki. 
Consumer preferences on bundles c k are given by utility functions U~(ck), ~J+ ~  ~, 
which are monotonically increasing in each of the j  coordinates. On X~, this may 
be written equivalently as 
K 
vi(xi)=  ~  X~Ui(ck).  (1) 
k=l 
Prices of commodities are given by a price vector f  =  9U+. The utility maximizing 
consumer solves 
max vi(xi)  (2) 
xi 
K  K 
subject to  ~  fkx~ <  ~  fk~=fk,, 




Given the definition of a commodity, a firm is needed to produce the commodities 
in the set C from the endowments. The firm's production set is 
Z  =  zkc  k <_ 0  (5) 
where  z k  is  negative  (respectively positive) if commodity k  is  used  as  an  input 
(respectively output) in the production plan z. The production process is constant 
returns to scale and thus there is no loss in generality in assuming a single firm. The 298  R. Garratt 
profit maximization exercise of the firm is 
K 
max  ~  fkzk  (6) 
z  k=l 
subject to zeZ.  (7) 
Maximization by the firm places restrictions on the prices fk, that are presented in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition  1.  If there exists a solution to equations (6)-(7),  then there exist ~b~ >_ O, 
j=  1,..., J, such that for k =  1,. . . , K, 
1 
fk=  E  ~Jc~. 
j-I 
Proof.  Suppose at prices f' that z' is a  solution to equations (6)-(7) but that the 
proposition is not true. Then at prices f', z' is not a solution to the less-constrained 
problem 
K 
max  ~  fkzk  (8) 
z  k=l 
K 
subject to  ~  zkc~ < O,  j =  1  ..... J,  (9) 
k=l 
ze~R K.  (10) 
This is true, since the existence of ~0  j > 0, j =  1,..., J, that satisfy the condition of 
Proposition 1, is necessary for z' to be a solution to equations (8)-(10).  However, z' 
satisfies equations (9)-(10).  Thus, there exists an alternative choice, z", that satisfies 
equations (9)-(10)  but has 
K  K 
Z  f k'zk'>  ~  f  k'zk''  (11) 
k=l  k=l 
In fact, we may choose z" to be a  vector of rational numbers. This is true, since 
cke~ J implies any unique  solution to equations (8)-(10)  contains only rational 
values. Also, for any non-unique solution containing irrational values, there exists 
an alternative solution, on the same exposed face, whose values are all rational. 
Ifz"e~ K then we have a contradiction. Ifz"r  r then, since cke~ J, there exists 
an integer M  such that Mz"~Z K. Clearly Mz" is a solution to the problem 
1  K 
max ~  k~=fk'z k  (12) 
1  r 
--  zcj<_O,  j=l  ..... J,  (13)  subject to  Mk=I 
z~  K.  (14) 
But this problem is equivalent to equations (6)-(7).  Therefore, we again have a 
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A  production  plan  zeZ  is  defined  to  be  purely  feasible  (i.e.,  feasible  in  a 
non-stochastic sense) if 
I 
zk+  Z  r  (15) 
i=1 
for all k. That is, the required inputs of each commodity do not exceed the total 
endowment of each commodity. 
Definition 1.  A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is a price vector f* and a state [(x*), z*] 
such that 
(i)  x* is a solution to equations (2)-(4)for each consumer i, 
( ii)  z* solves equations (6)-(7),  and 
I  I 
(iii)  Z  x* <_z* +  Z  ~i. 
i=1  i=1 
Since Henry [10] it has been well known that a competitive equilibrium may not 
exist in economies with multiple indivisible consumption goods (i.e., where  the 
number of divisible and indivisible consumption goods is greater than two). The 
existence of equilibrium is also addressed for economies with some divisible goods 
and some indivisible goods by Broome [2] and MasColell [13]. For economies in 
which all consumption goods are indivisible, the type considered here, the existence 
of  equilibrium  is  addressed  by  Dierker  [5].  Dierker  proves  the  existence  of 
allocations which are nearly price equilibria for large economies, in the sense that 
the percentage of unsatisfied demand gets arbitrarily small. He also proves that 
existence can be assured if  consumers possess a certain degree of  price insensitivity. 
3.  Trade with lotteries 
In  order  to  consider lotteries, extend  the  consumption  sets  X~ by  relaxing  the 
zero-one restrictions. The extended sets are 
W~=  w~egt~  wi=  . 
k=l 
(16) 
Clearly X i is a subset of Wi. The idea of specifying the consumption set in this way 
comes from Prescott and Townsend [ 17] and [ 18]. The individual demands w~ W~ 
may be interpreted as lotteries where w~ is the probability of receiving the bundle 
c  k as the final consumption. Consumer preferences over elements in their consump- 
tion sets (i.e., over lotteries) are given by functions v~(w~) as defined in Section 2. 
Note that consumers are now assumed to be expected utility maximizers. 
The firm also has increased production possibilities. Their production set Z al- 
ready contains a countable number of points, which can be denoted zl, z 2  .... z  ...... 
In the lottery economy, the firm can also produce probability distributions over Z. 
Let q)={~p={to._>O}~=l.~p  =  l}, where ~p~ denotes the probability attached 300  R. Garratt 
to production plan z.. The production set of the firm is 
Y={yEglK:y=~(p,Zn},  (17) 
where (p ~ @. 
It is interesting to compare the production set  Y to that described in Prescott 
and Townsend [-18, Section 4] for the continuum-of-consumers economy. In the 
latter case, inputs and outputs are defined in terms of signed measures. Thus the 
production set is 
Y= {~eL: j" cy(de) _< 0}  (18) 
where L  is  a  linear space.  For economies in which there are a  finite number of 
commodities (i.e., consumption bundles), k =  1  ..... K, the production set given by 
equation (18) becomes 
As the following proposition reveals, the production sets Y and ~'contain the same 
points (although the interpretation of the points in the two sets differ depending 
upon the context). 
Proposition 2.  Y= Y.. 
Proof.  See the Appendix.  ￿9 
Because Z =  Y, Proposition 1 still holds, and any equilibrium prices f  must be 
generated by shadow prices ~p. In view of the structure of prices, the consumer's 
problem is 
K 
max vi(wi) =  ~.  w~ui(c k)  (20) 
wi  k  =  1 
K 
subject to  ~  tk.ckw~ <_ t).c k`,  (21) 
k=l 
wi~W  i.  (22) 
This is a linear programming problem with two linearly independent constraints. 
Both this problem and the dual problem have feasible solutions, thus both have 
optimal solutions. 
Let 
.......  and 
denote the set of attainable certainty allocations corresponding to the production 
znEZ.  The sets An each contain a  finite number of points, which can be denoted 
Xn, 1  .....  Xn,t  .....  Xn,lA~l. For each n, probability distributions over A. are described by 
Fn =  2nsgll+a"l: ~  )vn,~  =  1  .  (24) 
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Definition 2.  A  lottery equilibrium (LE) is a price vector f*  and a state  [(w*), ~p*] 
such that 
( i )  w* is a solution to equations (20)-(22)for each consumer i, 
(ii)  y* maximizes f*.y  subject to ye Y, 
( iii )  for each z, such that ~o* > O, z, is purely feasible, and 
(iv)  there exist 2", 2"2, ￿9  ￿9  -, ).~,.*.. with 2* E F, for each n, such that 
k.  Zq~*  Z  2*  (25)  Wi  ~  n,t 
n  {t:x~,t =  i} 
for all k and for all i. 
Conditions  (iii)  and (iv) are the feasibility conditions for an equilibrium  state 
[(w*),~0*].  Together,  they  say  that  individual  demands  w  k*  must  be  marginal 
distributions of some joint probability distribution over purely feasible allocations 
I  I 
for the whole economy. Conditions (i)-(iii) plus  ~  w k* < yk* +  Z  ~k for all k are 
i=1  i=1 
necessary for a LE. However, they are clearly not sufficient. 
It is now possible to address the issue of existence of a LE. Existence of a LE in 
this model is not guaranteed. Three examples are now provided which demonstrate 
this. In Example  1 an economy is considered where there are no gains to having 
individual  consumers' final  consumptions  determined  by lottery,  but  where  the 
introduction  of trade  involving  lotteries  destroys  any  possible  equilibrium.  In 
Example 2  an economy is considered  where  there  are welfare improving lottery 
allocations that cannot be decentralized without specific bounds on the amount of 
each consumption good. Finally, in Example 3 the implications of having consumers 
in the economy who are risk loving are explored. 
3.1.  Example  I 
Consider an economy with two consumers and two indivisible consumption goods. 
That is, commodities are consumption bundles in ~2.  Let ul(c) = (c1)2/3(c2) 1/3 and 
Uz(C) = (c01/3(c2) 2/3. Let C =  {c~  2 :c 1 _< 3, c z <_ 3}. There are sixteen commodities. 
Their  ordering  is  not  important.  However,  it  is  useful  to  identify  the  following 
commodities:  c1=(0,0),  c/=(l,1),  c3=(2,1),  c~=(3,1),  c5=(1,2),  c6=(3,2), 
c7=(1,3),  cS=(2,3),  c9=(3,3). 1  Each  consumer  is  endowed  with  one  unit  of 
commodity 2. 
Normalize prices by setting ~b2= 1.  In order to rule out  the possibility of an 
equilibrium one must show that conditions (i)  (iv) of Definition 2 are not satisfied 
for  any  ~a~9~+.  The  consumer's  problem  does  not  change  if  we  drop  the 
K 
zero-commodity from the set C  and require  ~  wki--  <  1 for each consumer i. The 
k=2 
advantage  is  that  given  our  choice  of  preferences  and  endowments  for  each 
K 
consumer we are assured that the constraint  ~  w  k <  1 will never be binding and 
k=2 
1 These sixteen commodities are identified in the same way throughout the rest of the paper. 302  R. Garratt 
therefore  can be dropped.  Then,  the  solution  to  the  consumer's problem  simply 
involves buying as much as possible of the commodity (or commodities) for which 
u,(c k) 
-- is the greatest. 2 To reinterpret the solution as lottery the zero-commodity may 
ok  K 
k in the solution.  be reintroduced with w~ =  1 -  ~  w i 
k=2 
4  For  0 <  01<.8,  consumer  1  demands  commodity  4  with  probability  w I - 
0 1 Jr- 1  24/332/3 --22/33 
-->0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For  .8 <  01<  25/3 _21/332/3,  consumer  2 
301+1 
01+1 
S __ __  >  0, which is not feasible.  demands commodity 8 with probability w 2  201  -}- 3 
24/332/3 _  22/33 
At 01 =  25/3 _  21/332/3, consumer 2 demands any combination of commodities 
8 >  0  is  not  8  and  5  that  satisfies  (201 +  3)wz  s +  (01 +  2)w~ =  01 +  1.  However,  w 2 
01+1 
feasible.  Therefore,  we  need  only  consider  the  case  where  5  1  At 
24/332/3  _  22/33 
0 
1  z  3  25/3_ 2~/332/3,  consumer  1 demands  commodity  3  with  probability  w 1 = 
01 +  1  1  However, the demands w2S >  ~1 and  3 >  1 are also not feasible. To see  -->~-.  W  1 
201+  1 
this,  note  that  these  allocations  require  yS>￿89 and  y3 >~.1  But  this  implies 
~o*z2 >  ￿89  and  Z  ~P *z3 >  ￿89 Given the specified endowments the pure feasibility of 
n  n 
k >  0 for all k :# 2 (see Definition 2, condition  each z, for which ~o* >  0 implies that z, 
(iii)).  Using this fact, and since z, eZ,  it follows that,  -2(1, 1) +  z3(2, 1) +  z,5(1,2) _< 
3 and z 5 must each be equal to either 0  or  (0, 0) for all z, such that ~p* >  0. Thus, z, 
1, and both cannot be equal  to  1 for the  same n.  This implies  Z  ~P* >  ~  ~~  5 + 
3  n  n 
E  q)n Z  n >  l. 
n 
24/332/3 _  22/33  25/3 _  32/321/3 
For  25/~21/332/3  <  01  <  32/324/3 _  2z/33, consumer  1 demands  commodity 
01+1 
3 _  ~ and consumer 2 demands  commodity 5 with  3 with probability  w I  201 +  1 >~ 
01  ~-  1  01  =  25/3 -- 32/321/3 
5  1  probability w 2  01 +  2 >  3, which is not feasible. At  32/324/~  3 _  22/33, consumer 
1 demands  any combination of commodities 6  and  3 that satisfies  (301 +  2)w~ + 
(201+ l)w~ =  01+  1.  However,  w 6 >  0  is  not  feasible.  Therefore,  we  need  only 
01  25/3 __ 32/321/3 
3  +1  1  At01 
-  >  ~.  32/324/3  _  22/33,  consumer  2  consider  the  case  where  w 1  201+  1 
01+1 
5 _  >  ￿89 However. we have already  demands commodity 5 with probability w z  01 +  2 
1  pointed out that the demands wl>  ~3 1 and w~ >  ~ are not feasible. 
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25/3  _  32/321/3 
For  <  01 <  1.3, consumer 1 demands commodity 6 with prob- 
32/324/3  _  22/33 
01+1 
ability w 6 -  -- >  0,  which  is not feasible. Finally, for  0 ~ >  1.3,  consumer  2 
301  +  2  01  "I- 1 
7 =  __  >  0, which is not feasible. Thus,  demands commodity 7 with probability w e  0 ~ +  3 
there does not exist a  LE. 
It is interesting to note that for this example there does exist an equilibrium if 
we assume a  continuum  of consumers with an equal measure (measure  l) of each 
type.  Then,  the  appropriate feasibility constraint  is  as  specified in  Prescott  and 
Townsend  [18].  At  prices  0=(1,1)  consumer  1  demands  a  lottery  between 
1  commodity 3 and commodity 1 with probabilities Wl  3 =  ~ and w I =  1  respectively, 
while consumer 2 demands a lottery between commodity 5 and commodity 1 with 
probabilities w 25 _- -52 and  w~ =  5  ~ respectively. The  production  plan y3 =  5,2  y5  =  -52 
y2 =  _  2, yl =  2 and y~ =  0 for all other k maximizes the firm's profit at these prices. 
Futhermore,  for  these  demands  and  production  the  resource  constraint  for  the 
continuum-of-consumers economy is satisfied with an equality. 
In Example 1 a LE does not exist for the two consumer economy. For arbitrary 
finite numbers of consumers a  LE may or may not exist. ALE  will exist at prices 
0  =  (1, 1)  for  all  replications  of the  specified economy  in  which  the  number  of 
consumers of each type is divisible by three. 3 
3.2.  Example 2 
Consider  an  economy  with  three  consumers  and  two  indivisible consumption 
goods.  Let ul(c) = (CLC2)  1/2, u2(c) --- (Cl)64(c2) "36  and  u3(c  ) =  (q)'36(e1)64.  Assume 
C = {ceZ2+ :cl <  5,  c 2 <  5}  and  that each  consumer is endowed  with  one  unit  of 
commodity 2. There are now thirty-six commodities. Identify the following addi- 
tional  commodities:  c1~  ca1=(5,1),  c12=(4,2),  c13=(5,2),  c14=(5,3), 
C  15 =  (1,4),  c 16 =  (2, 4), c 17 =  (5, 4), c 18 =  (1, 5),  C 19 =  (2, 5), c 2~ =  (3, 5), c 21 =  (4, 5). 
In this example there are welfare gains from introducing lotteries. Specifically, 
9  1  1  2  3  2  1  1  5  2  1  1  the allocation Wl =  3,  wl =  3,  w2 =  5, w2 =  -5, w3 =  3,  w3 =  ~, is feasible. To see this 
2  -3,  1  2,  set  ~o 1 =  I,  q92 =  32  where  the  pure  production  z 1  is  given  by  z 1 =  z 1 = 
=  2=_3,  1  1,  3  1, ZzS=l. Let  z19  l,  and the pure production z 2 is given by z 2  z 2 =  z 2 = 
1  --  1  =l,  x1,1  be the p~  in Al  that  has x911.1=  l, x1,,  lk  =Oforallk#9,  x12,1_x13,1 
1  =1~  andx12,~k _--x13,  ~k  =0  for all k#  l.  Let  x2,1  be the point inA 2thathasx2~,l 
k  Oforallk#3,  and  5  k  =Oforallk#l,  x3  1  1, x2~, 1  x23,1  x2,,1  ,  =  =  =  1, X23,1  =  0 for all 
k #  5. Then, choose ),1.1 =  1 and )-2,1 =  1. Furthermore, vi(wi) > vi(r  for i =  2, 3 and 
v~(wl)= v1(r  However,  we  now  show  that  this  state  cannot  be  decentralized 
as a  LE. 
Normalize  prices  by  setting  02 =  1.  For  0_< 01 <  .39,  consumer  2  demands 
01+1 
11 =  >  0, which is not feasible. For .39 <  commodity 11 with probability w 2  50 1 +  1 
3 This sort of dependence  on the number  of consumers  required  for the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium also appears in the analysis of the "Bridge Game" by Shubik 1-17]. 304  R. Garratt 
13_  0 t+l 
4,1< .44, consumer 1 demands commodity 13 with probability w I  >  0, 
4.64 _  3.64  501 +  2 
which is not feasible. For .44 <  4,1 <  3"644 _  4"643 , consumer 2 demands commodity 
10 with probability w~ ~  0~ +  1  -  >  0, which is not feasible. 
401+  1 
4.64 _  3-64 
At 01  3'644- 4.643, consumer 2 demands  any combination of commodities 
4  1  wlO  10and4that satisfies(401  +  1)w~  ~ +(34,1 +  1)w 2 =  4,  +  1. However,  >0isnot 
,_  4,'+1  ~. 
feasible.  Therefore,  we  need  only  consider  the  case  where  w 2  >  At 
4.64 __ 3.64  301  +  1 
01  3644 -- 4 .643' consumer 1 demands any combination of commodities 3 and 12 
that satisfies (24,1 +  1)w 3 +  (401 +  2)Wll  2 =  01 +  1. However, wi 2 >  0 is not feasible. 
01+1 
3 _  1  However,  Therefore,  we  need  only  consider  the  case  where  w 1  >3- 
24,1+1 
4.64_3.64 
1 and  3  1  the  demands  w~ >  ~  w I >  ~  are  also  not  feasible.  For  3.644 _  4.643 <  0//1 < 
2.53__5'53-5 
5-53"~  2 55' consumer 1 demands commodity 3 with probability w~  01 +  1 
--  > 
-  .  201  +1 
4,1+1 
-  >  ￿89 which  1 and consumer 2 demands commodity 4 with probability w 2 
2.53_5.53.5  301 +  1 
is  not feasible.  At 01 -  consumer  1 demands  any combination  of 
5-53.52_2.55' 
commodities 3 and 14 that satisfies (201 +  1)w 3 +  (54,1 +  3)wll 4 =  01 +  1. However, 
01+1 
--  >  Wll 4 >  0 is not feasible. Therefore, we need only consider the case where w 3  201 +  1 
2.53_5.53.5 
1  At  01-  consumer  2  demands  commodity  4  with  probability 
~'  5.53.52_2.55, 
0 lq-I  3  1 
W24 =  ____  >  ~..1 However, we have already pointed out that the demands w 1 > 
34,1+ 1 
1  and w~ >  ~ are not feasible. 
2-53 _5-53-5 
For  <  01 _< .63, consumer  1 demands commodity 14 with  prob- 
5-53.52_2.55 
4,1+1 
ability  w 114-  >0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For  .63 <  01<_ .71,  consumer  3 
501 +  3  01 +  1 
demands commodity 21 with probability w z~ -  >  0, which is not feasible. 
44,1  +5 
13  For  .71 <  4,1 _<.79,  consumer 2  demands  commodity  13  with  probability  w 2  = 
01+1 
-->0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For  .79 <01  <_.89,  consumer  1  demands 
501 +  2  01 +  1 
commodity  17  with  probability  wl 7-  >0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For 
501 +4 
.89 < 01 <  1, consumer 3 demands commodity 20 with probability w~ ~ -  01 +  1 
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which is not feasible. For 1 <  01 _< 1.12,  consumer 2 demands commodity 14 with 
0a+l 
probability w2  TM -  >  0, which is not feasible. For 1.12 <  01 <  1.26, consumer 
501 +  3  01 +  1 
21 _  >  0, which is not feasible.  1 demands commodity 21 with probability w 1  401 +  5 
For  1.26 <  01 <  1.5,  consumer 3 demands commodity  19  with  probability  w~ 9 = 
01+I 
-->0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For  1.5 <  01__< 1.59,  consumer  2  demands 
201 +5 
01+1 
commodity 17 with probability w~ v =  >  0, which is not feasible. For 1.59 < 
3.55.52 _  2.55  501 +  4 
20  01 <  2.53_ 3.55.5  , consumer  1 demands  commodity 20 with  probability  w 1  = 
01+1 
--  >  0, which is not feasible. 
301 +  5 
3.55.52_2.55 
At 01  -  --  2"53 _  3.55.5  , consumer  1 demands any combination of commodities 
20  and  5  that  satisfies  (301 +  5)w~ ~ +(01 +2)w 5 =  01 +  I.  However,  Wl  2~ >0  is 
0 I+1  1  5  >~.  not  feasible.  Therefore,  we  need  only  consider  the  case  where  w 1  01+  2 
3.55.52_2.55 
At  01-  consumer  3  demands  commodity  7  with  probability 
2.53_3.55.5  , 
01+1  1  However,  the  demands  5  1 and  7  1  W3  7 =  @ 1 +3  >  ~"  W1  >  ~  W3 >  ~- are  also  not  feasible. 
3.55.52 _  2.55  3.644 _  4.643 
For  <  01  2'53_ 3.55.5  <  4 .64-  3 .64  ,  consumer  1 demands  commodity 5  with 
01+1  1 and  consumer  3  demands  commodity  7  with  prob-  5=-->  5  probability  w 1  01 +2 
7  0101  1  -  >  3,  which  is  not  feasible.  At  01  3'644-4"643  ability  w 3  0i+  3  4 .64- 3 .64  ,  consumer  3 
demands  any  combination  of commodities  7  and  15  that  satisfies  (01 +  3)w~ + 
(01 +  4)w~ 5 =  01 +  1.  However,  w~ s >  0  is  not  feasible.  Therefore,  we need  only 
01  -'}- I  01  3"644--4"643 
,7  1  At  --  consumer  1  consider  the  case  where  ~3  ~//1+3>~ ￿9  4.64_3.64  , 
T 
demands  any  combination  of commodities  5  and  16  that  satisfies  (01 +2)w~ + 
(201  +  4)wll 6 =  01  -}- |.  However,  wll 6 >  0  is  not feasible.  Therefore,  we need  only 
4,1 +  1 
5=  2"1  However,  we have already  pointed  out  consider  the  case where  w I  ~f..~  > 
7  5  1  that the demands w 3 >  ￿89  and w 1 >  ~ are not feasible. 
3.644 _  4.643 
For  4.64_3.64  <01  <2.5,  consumer 3  demands  commodity  15  with  prob- 
01+1 
15_  >0,  which  is  not  feasible.  For  2.5<01  <2.7,  consumer  1  ability  w 3  01 +  4 
01 
19__  +1  demands commodity 19 with probability w 1  >  0, which is not feasible. 
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Finally, for if/1  >  2.7, consumer 3 demands commodity 18 with probability  w~ s = 
~1+1 
-- >  0, which is not feasible. Thus, there does not exist a  LE. 
q,~+5 
If we set the bounds on each consumption good to 3 or 4, then the  preferred 
allocation can be achieved as part of a  LE. Namely at prices ~  =  (1, 1), the feasible 
911232  t=~,W5=_~  1  1  allocation w~ =  g, w x =  g, w 2 =  ~, w 2  w 3 =  ~, is utility maximizing for 
each consumer and the implied production maximizes profits for the firm. 
3.3.  Example  3 
Consider an economy with two consumers and two indivisible consumption goods. 
Let Ux(C  ) =  (CLC2)  3/4 and u2(c ) =  (qc2) 1/2.  Suppose consumer  1 is endowed with  1 
unit of commodity 5 and consumer 2 is endowed with  1 unit of commodity 3. It is 
clear that both consumers may gain through trade over lotteries. However, for any 
~9t  2  the solution to consumer l's problem is for consumer 1 to demand as much 
probability as she can afford on the 'largest' commodity (with the desired  ratio of 
the two consumption goods) in her consumption set. If consumers imagine they can 
buy commodities whose production requires  more than the total resources of the 
economy, consumer l's demand will not be feasible. That is, a  LE will not exist. 
However, if we set  bj =  3,  j  -  1,2,  then  a  LE can  be  achieved.  To  show  this 
consider  prices  ~* =(~1,1//2)=(1,  1).  Solving  equations  (20)-(22)  we  find  that 
consumer  1 wishes  to  spend  all  her  income  on  commodity 9.  This  amounts  to 
1 probability  on commodity 9 and ￿89  consumer  1 demanding a  lottery which puts 
probability on commodity 1. It is easily verified that this lottery also maximizes the 
expected utility of consumer 2. Let z 13 _- _  1, z15 =  _  1, zll =  1, z19 =  1 and z~k =  0 for 
all  other k. Then Zl  is  purely feasible.  Also, q~' =  1 is  profit  maximizing  at  these 
prices. Let x1,1 be the point in A I that has x~1~.1 =  1, x~,l =  0 for all k r  1, x92,~  =  1, 
and x12,1k  =Oforallkr  Letx~,2bethepointinAl  thathasx~l,  =  1, Xll,  -~-0 
for  all  k r  9,  and  Xa2,2k =  0  for  all  k r  1.  Then  condition  (iv)  of Definition  2  is 
satisfied with 2*  -  1 and 2"  =  ￿89 Thus, there exists a  LE.  1,1  --2  1,2 
In this context a feasible state (i.e., a state which satisfies conditions (iii) and (iv)) 
[(wl),~0]  is  a  Pareto  optimum  if there  does not exist  an  alternative  feasible  state 
[(w'i)~p'] with the property  that vi(w'i)>_ v~(w~)  for all  i with  a  strict  inequality for 
some i. Note that deterministic feasible states are included in this definition. Thus, 
states that were Pareto optimal under the previous specification of the consumption 
and production sets may no longer be Pareto optimal after we allow randomization. 
The fact that LE do not always exist suggests that in some cases there may be Pareto 
optimal states that cannot be decentralized as LE for any specification of endow- 
ments. This failure of the Second Welfare theorem is easily verified. In Example  1 
the allocation w 2 =  1, i =  1,2, is Pareto optimal. However, we saw that there are no 
prices for which both consumers will demand commodity 2.  This result  does not 
depend on their initial endowments. 
It is apparent that for a given finite-consumer economy with indivisible commo- 
dities a LE may or may not exist, Whether or not a LE exists depends on the com- 
position of consumer characteristics in the economy and on the choice of bounds bj. 
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of goods can result in  the existence of a  LE.  In the next section  we consider an 
alternative approach. 
4.  Trade with a finite number of extrinsic states of nature 
Suppose that rather than being free to choose their own lotteries, consumers are 
only allowed to purchase state contingent commodities based on a predetermined, 
finite or possibly degenerate set of extrinsic states of nature. The states and their 
probabilities will be chosen to suit the allocation that we seek to decentralize. How 
members of society negotiate  the  selection  of a  commonly accepted  probability 
space or how robust the choice of the probability space is to the introduction  of 
alternative probability spaces is not considered. 
Sunspots are introduced, in the manner of Shell and Wright [22],  by means of 
a probability space (S, 22, n) where S is the set of states, 2; is the or-algebra of subsets 
of S  and  ~  is  a  probability  measure.  If the  set  of states  of nature  is  given  by 
S={s 1 ..... Sh,...,Sn},  then  there  are  KH  state  contingent  commodities.  Let 
2i(Sh) = (2~(Sh)  .... ,2k(Sh),..., 2iK(Sh))  and  let  2 i = (2i(sl) ..... 2i(Sh)  ..... 2i(Sn) ).  The 
consumption set of consumer i is 
Xl = {2i~rl-l:2k(sh)=Oor  1VkandVsh~S,  and k=l~ 2k(Sh)=lVshES}.  (26) 
Endowments do not depend on the state of nature so we let ~i(Sh) ---- ~'~ for all Sh~S. 
Let  P(Sh)= (Pl(Sh) ..... pk(Sh) ..... pK(Sh) )  represent  the  prices  of the  K  contingent 
commodities in state s h and let p -- (p(sl) ..... P(Sh) ..... p(sn)). 
In an economy in which there are H extrinsic states of nature consumer i solves 
H 
max  ~  7~(Sh)li(2i(Sh) )  (27) 
xi  h- 1 
H  K  H 
subject to  ~  ~  pk(Sh)2k(sh)<  ~  pk'(Sh)  ,  (28) 
h=l  k=l  h=l 
2ieXi,  SheS  (29) 
The production set of the firm is 
2  =  2k(Sh)C  k <_ O, VSh~S  .  (30) 
1 
The firm maximizes profits by solving 
H  K 
max  ~  ~  pk(Sh)~k(sh)  (31) 
4  h=l  k=l 
subject to ~2.  (32) 
An equilibrium to the state contingent commodities economy is now defined. 
Definition 3.  An equilibrium to the state contingent  commodities  economy consists of 
a probability  space (S, 22, ~z), prices p*, allocations  2* and production ~* such that 308  R. Garratt 
( i )  2* is a solution to equations (27)-(29)for each consumer i, 
(ii)  ~* is a solution to equations (31)-(32) and 
I  I 
(iii)  ~,  2~(Sn) <_  ~,  (i + $*(sh)for all SheS. 
i=1  i=1 
Equilibria for which the specified state space is degenerate (contains only one 
state) are WE. If the specified state space is not degenerate but the allocations and 
production do not depend on the observed state of nature then the equilibria are 
non-sunspot equilibria (non-SE). If the specified state space is not degenerate and 
the allocation of some or all consumers or production do depend on the observed 
state of nature then the equilibria are sunspot equilibria (SE). 
It is trivial that any non-SE may be realized as a WE although for non-convex 
economies it is not necessarily true that all WE will survive the introduction of 
extrinsic  uncertainty. This  was  demonstrated  in  Shell  and  Wright  [22]  and  is 
apparent for these economies. However, if the WE is also a LE the introduction of 
extrinsic uncertainty is of no consequence. This idea is the point of Proposition 3 
below. 
We wish to compare existence of equilibria under different trading stories for 
the  same  economy. However, a  description  of the  economy usually  includes  a 
specification of the consumption and production sets which differ here depending 
on the trading story. Economies are therefore described by an array of the following 
base characteristics ((ui), (ck'), (b~)). The specification of consumption and production 
sets is obvious from the equilibrium concept considered. 
Proposition 3.  Suppose  a  LE exists  in  which each  consumer's final  consumption  is 
deterministic.  Then the same state and prices are a WE for an economy with the same 
characteristics.  Furthermore,  the  WE  will reappear  as  a  non-SE for  any  extrinsic 
probability space. 
Proof.  Let f*, [(w*), q~*] be a  deterministic LE for some economy. Suppose the 
deterministic production is z 1 (i.e., ~p* =  1). It is obvious a WE exists at prices f* 
with x* =  w* for all i, and production z* = zl. Now consider any non-degenerate 
extrinsic  probability  space  (one may even  consider  a  probability  space  with  a 
continuum  of  states  (See  Shell  and  Wright  [22]  for  a  description)).  Define 
2"~ (Sh) ~  x~ V Sh E" S and V  i. Set $*(Sh) = Z l V sh eS. Let p*(Sh)  = f  *TZ(Sh)  , V S h. Conditions 
(ii) and (iii) of Definition 3 are obviously satisfied. Suppose condition (i)is not. That 
is, suppose at prices p*(Sh)  some  consumer strictly prefers an allocation 2~ in their 
budget set that has 2i(Sh) V: 2i(Sh,) for some Sh and Sh,. (If a  continuum of states is 
assumed  this must  occur over a  set  of states with  strictly positive measure.)  So 
H  H 
~,  7Z(Sh)Vi(2i(Sh))>  ~_,  ~(Sh)Vi(2*(Sh)).  Consider a  lottery allocation for this  con- 
h=l  h=l 
H 
sumer defined by wi =  ~,  ~Z(Sh)2i(Sh).  This consumption was affordable when w* was 
h=l  H  K 
chosen. That is, since 2 i was assumed to be affordable we have  ~  ~  pk(sh)2k(Sh) <__ 
h=lk~l 
H 
2  pki*(Sh)" Also, given the specification of prices p*(sh) and our definition of w i 
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K  K  H 
this implies  ~,  fk*w~ <fk,.. Furthermore, v,(wi)---  ~  w~u,(c k) =  ~  n(Sh)V~(2~(Sh)  ) 
k=l  k=l  h=l 
K  H 
and  l)i(W~)  E  *k  k  =  W i  Ui(C  )~-  2  7~(Sh)l)i(2"~l (sh))"  So  ui(wi)~>  ui(w~)  which  is  a  con- 
k=l  h=l 
tradiction.  ￿9 
Next it is shown that non-deterministic LE states can also be decentralized, using 
the appropriate probability space, with trade in state contingent commodities. Thus 
restricting  the  set  of possible  lotteries  available  to  consumers  a  priori,  if done 
correctly, does not destroy the equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.  Any non-deterministic LE is also a SE for an economy with the same 
characteristics. 
Proof.  Let [(w*), 0"]  be a  LE state  at  prices f*.  We  define a  probability  space 
(S, Z', re) as follows. Identify states in S by the subscript pairs n, t. Let n(s,.0 =  ~,n"*2*,,,. 
Clearly, n(s,,,) _> 0 and ~  n(s,,,) =  1. Define production of each commodity k in each 
n,t 
state by 2~*(s,,t) =  z,  k and let 2i(s,,t) =  n,~,~, i =  1  ..... I, be the allocation in state s,,t. 
Let prices of commodities contingent on these states be given as p*(s,,,) =f*n(s,,,). 
Using  these relationships  it can now be shown  that prices p*, production  2" and 
allocations 2* constitute a SE. 
Looking at condition (i) of Definition 3 it is first of all trivially true for prices 
p* that 2* is in the budget  set of consumer i. What needs to be shown is that 2* 
maximizes the expected utility of each consumer i over all allocations in the budget 
set. Suppose not. Then for some consumer i there exists an alternative allocation 21 
in consumer i's budget set such that 
Z  7[(Sn,t)Ui(2i(Sn,t)  ) >  E  7~(Sn,t)Ui(2~  (Sn,t))"  (33) 
n,t  n,l 
From  this  relation  it  is  possible  to show  that  there exists  a  wz~W satisfying the 
constraints of equations (20)-(22) that is preferred by consumer i to w*. For all k let 
w k = ~, n(S,,~)2k(s,,,).  (34) 
n,t 
K 




Z  ~,  Pk*(s,,')2k(s,,,) < ZPk'*(S,.')"  (35) 
n,t k = 1  n,t 
However, given the specification of state contingent prices this means 
K 
Z  fk*n(s,,*)2~(S,,,) <- ~fk'*n(S,,,)=fk~..  (36) 
n,t k = 1  n,t 
['k*vt,k  ~  fk~, as required.  But Z.,~n(s.,t)2~(s.,t) =  w k  Thus, ZkK=I~  "i 310  R. Garratt 
The L.H.S. of equation (33) may be rewritten as 
K  K 
U,(ck) y'rr(S.,tl2~(S,,,) =  ~  W~Ui(ck).  (37) 
k=l  n,t  k= l 
K 
By our initial specification of~ and (2"), R.H.S. equals  ~  W~*ui(ek). Thus, equation 
(33) can be rewritten as  k = 1 
K  K 
2  W~U'(ck) >  Z  W~*U'(cR)  (38) 
k=l  k=l 
which  is a  contradiction  to  w*  solving equations  (20)-(22)  for consumer  i. Thus, 
condition (i) of Definition  3 is satisfied. 
It is trivial that production  2" is in the set 2.  A  similar argument  to that used 
to verify condition  (i) may be  used  to show  2" is profit maximizing  for the  firm_ 
Thus, condition  (ii) of Definition  3 is satisfied. 
1  1 
Finally, note that x.,,eA, implies that  ~  x,,,, <_ z, +  ~  ~i for all t and n. By our 
i=1  i=1  I 
specification  of 2*(s,,,) and  ~*(s,,,),  and  since ~  =  ~, it follows that  y' 2*(s,,,) <_ 
I  i=1 
2*(s,,t) +  ~  ~i for all s,,tsS. Thus, condition (iii) of Definition  3 is satisfied.  ￿9 
i=1 
It is thus clear that any LE is also either a  WE or SE.  In fact, as the following 
propositions illustrate, some allocations can only be decentralized  if consumers are 
required  to accept a common (possibly degenerate)  randomization  device. 
Proposition 5.  There exist economies for which WE exist that are not (deterministic) 
LE for the same economies. 
Proof.  Consider the economy described in Example 1. It has been shown that a LE 
does not exist for this economy. However, consider prices t)* =  (1, 1). Then autarky 
is a WE.  ￿9 
Proposition 6.  There exist economies for which SE exist that are not (non-deterministic) 
LE for the same economies. 
Proof.  Consider the economy described in Example 2. It has been shown that a LE 
does not  exist for this  economy.  Now  suppose  that  trade  takes place in terms  of 
state contingent claims based on three equiprobable extrinsic states of nature, s 1, sz 
and  s3.  Then  a  SE  does  exist.  Namely,  prices  pk*(Sh)=  C~  for  all  h,  k  and 
3j=1 
allocations 29(sl) =  1, 21  _  ~1  1(s2) -  xl(s3) =  1, 2](sh) =  0 otherwise, 23(s2) =  22a(s3) =  1, 
2~(sl) =  1, 2ckz(sh) =  0 otherwise, 2~(s2) =  2~(s3) =  1, 2~(s~) =  1,2~(Sh) =  0 otherwise, 
and production  ~2(sl) =  -  3, 29(sl) =  1; ~2(Sh) =  -- 3, ~3(Sh) =  1, ~5(Sh) =  1, h =  2, 3; 
and ~k(Sh) =  0 otherwise, satisfy Definition  3,  ￿9 
Theorem 1.  Any  LE  is  either  a  WE  or  a  SE for  an  economy  with  the  same 
chafacteristics.  However, there are WE and SE that are not LE. 
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These results are analogous to results obtained by Peck and Shell [15] relating 
sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria for imperfectly competitive market games 
economies. Peck and Shell find that a correlated equilibrium to the market game is 
a  sunspot or non-sunspot equilibrium to the related securities game but that the 
converse is not necessarily true. 
5.  Conclusion 
The welfare gains obtainable by having final consumptions determined by lottery 
cannot  always  be  attained  via  decentralized  equilibria  if  trade  occurs  with 
unrestricted purchasing and  selling of lotteries. Placing bounds  on quantities  of 
consumption goods may solve the problem but this leaves open the question as to 
how the bounds  are determined. If consumers are restricted to lotteries that are 
defined in  terms of a  common, finite set  of extrinsic states  of nature,  a  sunspot 
equilibrium  can  exist  for economies  that  have  no  lottery  equilibrium.  In  fact, 
sunspot-economies with a continuum of extrinsic states of nature permit no fewer 
equilibria than exist in lottery-economies since the state-contingent prices in the 
sunspot-economy may vary across states. 
Nevertheless, some important questions remain unanswered. For instance, how 
is the probability space in the sunspot trading story selected? From a social planner's 
point of view this would be dictated  by the particular Pareto optimal state one 
wishes  to  achieve.  But  this  does  not  explain  how  market  participants  would 
coordinate themselves on a particular sunspot variable, or whether state contingent 
prices can always be found such that individuals will demand the proper allocation. 
Given  the  difficulty  of  decentralizing  lottery  allocations,  instances  where 
consumers band together to form explicit lottery contracts are not surprising. An 
example  in  this  spirit  is  provided  by  rotating  savings  and  credit  associations. 
Rotating savings and credit associations are organizations that pool funds enabling 
members to make large indivisible purchases sooner than they would be able to on 
their own. These organizations are studied by Besley, Coate and Loury [1] who 
point out that the random procedures used to allocate funds may provide higher 
expected utility for participants  than  they would  get from borrowing in  perfect 
capital markets. 
6.  Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2.  The method of proof is to show that each of the sets  Y and 
~" is equal to the convex hull of Z, to be denoted co Z. 
STEP 1. (Prove that  ~'= co Z.) 
Consider  the  sequences  of  sets  ~-q={ye~-:l)~kj<q, Vk}  and  Z q= 
{z,~Z:lzk[<q,  Vk}  where qe~.  Each  set  ~'q is closed, convex and bounded and 
lim  Yq =  g.  Define  co Z  =  lim co Z q.  For  each  q  the  extreme points  of  Y-q  are 
q~oo  q~oo 
integers which are contained in Z q. Denote the set of these extreme points by Z r 
By Theorem 33 of Fenchel [6, p. 52], "a closed bounded convex set is the convex 
hull of its extreme points." Thus, Yq =  Co Z q' for all q. By Corollary 1.6.3 of Ichiishi 312  R. Garratt 
[11,  p. 23]  co Z q' =  co Z q.  Thus,  ~'q -- co Z ~ for all q.  In the limit, as q ~  ~,  we  get 
"Y= co Z.  ￿9 
STEP 2.  (Prove that  Y =  co Z.) 
It  is  clear  that  co Z_  Y.  It  must  be  shown  that  Y~_coZ.  Again  let  Z ~= 
{z~Z:lzkl,  _< q, Vk} where qE~  and define co Z  =  lira co Z  q. By the definition of Y, 
q~vo 
it is true that for any y~ Y there exists q~ such that y =  ~  ~0.z.. Let 
n 
~0.  (39) 
zn6Zq 
The  lira q~  q~.  since lim  ~  ~Pn  I.  Let yq  ~  q  =  =  =  ~p,zn-  Then  yqecoZ  q  and 
q ~  ~  q ~  G(]  zn~l  q  znEl  q 
lira yq =  y. It must be shown that y~co  Z. Note that (yq}q ~  co Z  and co Z  is a  closed 
q--+  ~0 
set. Therefore, y~co  Z  since y is the limit of a sequence contained in a closed set.  ￿9 
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